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Abstract—Source location privacy is becoming an increasingly
important property of some wireless sensor network applica-
tions. The fake source technique has been proposed as an
approach for handling the source location privacy problem
in these situations. However, whilst the efficiency of the fake
source techniques is well documented, there are several factors
that limit the usefulness of current results: (i) the assumption
that fake sources are known a priori, (ii) the selection of fake
sources based on an prohibitively expensive pre-configuration
phase and (iii) the lack of a commonly adopted attacker model.
In this paper we address these limitations by investigating the
efficiency of the fake source technique with respect to possible
implementations, configurations and extensions that do not
require a pre-configuration phase or a priori knowledge of fake
sources. The results presented demonstrate that one possible
implementation, in presence of a single attacker, can lead to a
decrease in capture ratio of up to 60% when compared with
a flooding baseline. In the presence of multiple attackers, the
same implementation yields only a 30% decrease in capture
ratio with respect to the same baseline. To address this
problem we investigate a hybrid technique, known as phantom
routing with fake sources, which achieves a corresponding 50%
reduction in capture ratio.
Keywords-Wireless Sensor Networks; Fake Sources; Source
Location Privacy; Power Consumption; Multiple Attackers
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade the advent of wireless sensor net-
works has enabled several novel classes of applications,
such as monitoring and tracking. In the case of monitoring
applications, deployment of these sensor networks will vary
from critical applications, such as military, health and asset
monitoring, to non-critical applications, such as temperature
and humidity control. For critical applications, privacy will
be an important property. Due to the fact that wireless sensor
networks operate in a broadcast medium, attackers can easily
intercept messages and attempt to subvert a system.
The privacy threats that exist for sensor networks can be
broadly classified along two dimensions, namely (i) content-
based privacy threats and (ii) context-based privacy threats.
Content-based privacy threats relate to threats that are based
on the contents of messages, i.e., the threats are against
the values generated by the network layers either at the
application level (e.g., sensed values) or lower-layer levels
(e.g., time-stamps). Context-based privacy threats are based
on the context associated with the measurement and trans-
mission of sensed data. Context is a multi-attribute concept
that captures several environmental aspects associated with
sensed data, such as location and time. While content-based
threats are well-understood [10], context-based threats are
becoming increasingly important. For content-based threats,
nodes launching attacks are often modelled as Byzantine
nodes [6], with cryptographic techniques often being used
to address these problems [2] [6]. However, cryptographic
techniques do not address context-based threats.
One aspect of context that is important in several appli-
cations is location. Location information can be embedded
in a message, but remain inaccessible to an attacker due
to encryption of the message. Thus, if location information
cannot be directly obtained, then it can be inferred. One
important problem for monitoring applications is the prob-
lem of source location privacy. In this problem, a wireless
sensor network is monitoring an asset. The nodes detecting
the asset, known as source nodes, will periodically send
messages to a dedicated node, known as the sink node, for
data collection. If the location(s) of the source node(s) is
compromised, then an attacker can capture the asset.
It is possible to infer location information through various
techniques, depending on the power of the attacker. For
example, Metha et.al [8] assumes that an attacker has a
small wireless network of his own that can capture messages
and shows how the location of source nodes can be inferred
once messages have been intercepted. In contrast, Kamat
et.al [5] assumes a single attacker, who can use the adopted
routing protocol to infer the location of a source node. For
example, in a military environment, soldiers on surveillance
may relay information to a sink. An attacker can intercept
these messages and trace them back to their source, thereby
compromising the safety of the soldiers. Several techniques
to handle the source location privacy problem have been
proposed [1] [5] [7] [8] [13]. In this paper we focus on the
fake source technique. However, current results associated
with this technique are of limited relevance, since they make
a number of assumptions which limit their practicality: (i)
fake sources are known a priori, (ii) fake sources are selected
based on an prohibitively expensive pre-configuration phase
and (iii) no common attacker model is adopted.
To address the described limitations we investigate the
efficiency of fake sources with respect to possible imple-
mentations, configurations and extensions. We make several
novel contributions: (i) we detail possible implementations
of the fake source protocol that circumvents the need for
fake sources to be known a priori, (ii) we make no undue
assumption regarding the capabilities of the sensor nodes,
(iii) we investigate the efficiency of fake sources in presence
of a distributed eavesdropper, which can possibly have multi-
ple implementations, e.g., using single or multiple attackers,
and (iv) we develop a hybrid technique that accounts for
multiple attackers. In doing this we present results which
show that one possible implementation, in presence of a
single attacker, can lead to a decrease in capture ratio of
up to 60% when compared with a flooding baseline. In
the presence of multiple attackers, the same implementation
yields only a 30% decrease in capture ratio over the same
baseline. To counteract this problem we apply our hybrid
technique, known as phantom routing with fake sources,
which achives a corresponding 50% reduction in capture
ratio with respect to the same baseline.
A. Paper Structure
This paper is structured as follows: In Section II we provide
a survey of related work. In Section III we define the
network and attacker models used in the paper. In Section
IV we describe the protocols investigated, outlining their
key characteristics and the reasoning upon which they are
based. In Section V we outline our experimental approach.
The results generated are presented and discussed in Section
VI. Section VII concludes this paper with a paper summary.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of source location privacy first appeared around
2004 [5] [9]. Since then, the problem has been addressed
using a variety of attacker models and assumptions. These
varied attacker models and assumptions have led to the
development of many solutions and techniques for enhancing
source location privacy. Ozturk et.al [9] investigated the pri-
vacy imparted by flooding, and several other techniques such
as fake source and phantom routing. A similar investigation
was performed by Kamat et.al [5]. Subsequently, a new at-
tack was shown to subvert the technique proposed by Kamat
et.al [5], based on the assumption that nodes have access
to their location using GPS devices. The most commonly
adopted attacker model is a local attacker model, where
nodes have only local knowledge. Other approaches have
begun to investigate the impact of a global eavesdropper.
Under these circumstances it has been shown that, for a
fake source protocol where every node in the network acts
as a fake source, maximal privacy can be ensured.
Despite the body of work relating to source location pri-
vacy in wireless sensor networks, little work has investigated
the impact of possible fake source implementations and
configuration parameters on source location privacy. This
problem in directly addressed in this paper.
III. MODELS
In this section we detail the system / network and attacker
models adopted in this paper.
A. System Model
We define a wireless sensor node as a computing device
equipped with a wireless interface and associated with a
unique identifier. Communication in wireless sensor net-
works is typically modelled with a circular communication
range centred on the node, and we assume that all nodes
have the same communication range, implying that nodes
have omni-directional antennas. This assumption contrasts
with work that assumes directional antennas [12]. Under
this model a node is thought of as able to exchange data
with all devices within its communication range. A wireless
sensor network is a collection of wireless sensor nodes and
is modelled as an undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is
a set of N wireless sensor nodes and E is a set of edges or
links, each link being a pair of distinct nodes. A link exists
between two nodes if they are in each other s communication
range. Two nodes m ∈ V and n ∈ V are said to be 1-hop
neighbours (or neighbours) iff {m,n} ∈ E, i.e., m and n
are in each other’s communication range. We denote by M
the set of m’s neighbours. The graph G = (V,E) defines the
topology of the network. In this paper, we focus on grid-like
network topology, i.e., network of size n ∗ n = N .
There exists a distinguished node S in the network called
a sink, which is responsible for collecting data. Other nodes
v ∈ V \ {S} can sense data and then route the data to the
sink for collection. In general, any node can be a source of
sensed data. In this paper, however, we assume that only a
subset of nodes can be a source of sensed data. Specifically,
from our assumption of grid-like network, we assume nodes
on the perimeter of the network to be sources of sensed data.
Sensor nodes route messages to the sink, generally using
data aggregation convergecast protocols. It has been previ-
ously shown that an attacker can use routing information
to launch source-location privacy attacks. It has been also
shown that a basic routing strategy like flooding does not
have good source location privacy properties [5], and various
variants, e.g., use of fake source on top of flooding and
directed random walk followed by flooding, have been
proposed to improve the privacy provided by a given routing
strategy. We assume message content to be encrypted, thus it
can only be read by the correct node and not by an attacker.
B. Attacker Model
In this paper an attacker is considered to be a set of sensor
nodes. It has been proposed in [3] that the strength of
an attacker for wireless sensor can be captured along two
main dimensions, namely (i) presence and (ii) actions. For
example, presence can be local or global, while examples of
actions includes eavesdropping and reprogramming. Using
these two dimensions, a lattice of attacker strengths was
developed. Based on this lattice, we consider one type of
attacker, namely a distributed eavesdropping attacker. There
can be different implementations of this type of attacker. For
example, such an attacker can be a single mobile person with
a sensor node trying to eavesdrop. Another implementation
can be multiple persons, each with a sensor node, eaves-
dropping on the network. In this paper we consider these
two possible implementation of a distributed eavesdropper
and analyse the impact of a given routing strategy with
respect to the attacker implementation. We also assume that
the attacker does not have any knowledge of the network,
i.e., the attacker does not know the network topology or the
adopted routing algorithm. The only knowledge a distributed
eavesdropper has is that which is deduced based on the
eavesdropping on the network. For example, when a message
from a legitimate node within its neighbourhood is received,
the sender of that message can be located but the source of
the message is not known.
IV. FAKE SOURCE PROTOCOLS
In this section we describe the fake source technique for
providing source location privacy. We abstract away imple-
mentation details in order to identify important parameters
for any implementation of the technique, as well as present-
ing the implementations used in this paper.
A. Fake Sources
As its name suggests, the fake source technique involves
selecting a subset of nodes to act as fake sources, i.e., to
simulate a real source. The current state-of-the-art assumes a
priori knowledge of these fake sources. However, in practice
fake sources have to be chosen during operation. Previous
work on fake sources distinguished between temporary fake
sources and permanent fake sources [5]. This work con-
cluded that permanent fake sources outperform temporary
fake sources. In this paper we focus on permanent fake
sources. A permanent fake source is a node that continuously
sends network message to simulate a real source for at least
the duration of message transmission from the real source.
A real source is characterised by its location and message
transmission rate. Any implementation of the fake source
technique must investigate the impact of at least these two
parameters. It has been argued that better privacy is achieved
by having a fake source be a similar distance away from the
sink as the real source [5].
B. Fake Source 1 (FS1) Implementation
We assume that real sources uses a flooding protocol to send
messages to a sink. The flooding protocol is implemented as
follows. The source generates a message and then broadcasts
it to every node in its neighbourhood. The general structure
of a message is:
< text, count, hash, destination, origin, hops >
For example, a transmitted message might be:
< message, 1,message− 1,−, 121, 0 >
In this example, the unique identifier of the source node
is 121 and the destination field is empty. When a node
receives a message it checks the count value and determines
whether it is a new message. If this is a new message,
the node records the count value, increments the hop count
and forwards the message. The node will drop any message
that it has already been forwarded. Thus, using the flooding
protocol, messages generated by the real source is forwarded
by each node to the sink. When the sink receives the first
such message it broadcasts an away message to each of its
neighbours. The away message structure is:
< away, 1, away − 1,−, 99, 5 >
Here, as a matter of example, the sink id is 99 and the hop
distance between the real source and sink is 5. The nodes
that receive the away message check if they have received
a message from the source with the count value of 1. If
they have received such a message, the node reduces the hop
count by one and generates a choose message and broadcasts
this message to its neighbours. The purpose of this away
message is to ensure that only nodes that are further away
from the real source forward the choose message.
Each intermediate node that receives the choose message
will generate a random number R. If R is greater than a
given threshold τ , the node will decrement the hop count and
forward the message to its neighbours. Further, when a node
receives a choose message that has a hop-count value of 0,
the node generates its random number R. If R is greater than
τ , then the node becomes a fake source, and starts generating
messages, which we call fake messages. The structure of the
fake messages generated by a fake source is:
< fakemessage, 1, fakemessage− 1,−, 19, 0 >
C. Fake Source 2 (FS2) Implementation
The FS2 protocol is similar to FS1. As described previously,
the real source floods network messages to be delivered to
the sink. FS1 and FS2 differ in the way that intermediate
nodes communicate messages. In FS2 intermediate nodes
forward each choose message to all of its neighbours. In
FS2, when a node receives a choose message that has a hop-
count value of 0, the node generates a random number R. If
R is greater than a given threshold then the node becomes
a fake source and begins generating messages. The message
structures of choose and away messages are as in FS1.
The key difference between FS1 and FS2 techniques is
that, in FS1 all intermediate and final nodes generate a
random number to determine whether to forward a message
or to become a fake source. On the other hand, in FS2
only the final nodes generate the random number to decide
whether to become a fake source.
D. Design Decisions
By selecting a set of fake sources during operation, our
protocol becomes adaptive, in the sense that for every real
source, there exists a set of fake sources. This is in contrast
with earlier work, where a set of fake sources in chosen
at deployment time or is known a priori [5]. We are able
to obtain fake sources which are a similar distance away
from both the sink and real source by incrementing and
decrementing the hop count.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we outline the simulation environment and
protocol configurations that were used to generate the results
presented in this paper.
A. Simulation Environment
The simulation environment was based upon the JProwler
simulator [4]. JProwler is a discrete event simulator that can
accurately model sensor nodes and the communications be-
tween them. JProwler provides two radio models, Gaussian
and Rayleigh, which determine the signal level of transmis-
sions and the communication range of nodes. The Rayleigh
model was selected for use in all experiments because it
models the situation where sensor nodes have high mobility,
which is consistent with the assumption that an attacker will
have high mobility within a sensor network. An experiment
constituted a single execution of the simulation environment
using a specified protocol configuration, network size and
safety period. An experiment terminated when the source
node had been captured or the safety period had expired.
The JProwler simulator was extended to allow the safety
period, capture ratio and total energy consumption to be
monitored during simulation. Energy consumption was mea-
sured independently for each node in the network. The
adopted energy model was consistent with [11], thus values
for node voltage (Vnode), current at idle (Ii), current at send
(Is) and current at receive (Ir) were required. As in [11],
Vnode = 3V , Ii = Ir = 7mA and Is = 21.5mA. All
nodes were assumed to operate at maximum power, thus
the transmission strength of each node was also maximal.
B. Network Configuration
A square grid network layout was used in all experiments.
Experiments were performed for network sizes of 11, 15,
21 and 25, i.e., networks of 121, 225, 441 and 625 nodes
respectively. A single source node generated messages and
a single sink node collected messages. The source and sink
nodes were distinct. Messages were generated at a constant
rate of 1 message per second. The sets of experiments for
each network size were performed for five source node
locations; the four corners of the grid and a random location
at the perimeter of the grid. To ensure the validity of
the results presented, 100 repeats were performed for each
source location. The sink node was located at the centre
of the grid. Nodes were located 28 meters apart. The node
separation distance was determined analytically, based upon
the static fading values calculated by the adopted radio
model. This separation distance ensured that messages (i)
pass through multiple nodes from source to sink, (ii) can
move only one hop at a time and (iii) can only be passed to
horizontally or vertically adjacent nodes.
C. Protocol Configuration
All protocols were implemented according to the descrip-
tions given in Section IV. The flooding protocol was used as
a baseline against which other protocols were measured. All
experiments involving FS1 and FS2 were run with threshold
values of 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9.
D. Protocol Extension
Unique Messages (UM): In FS1 and FS2 fake sources gen-
erate fake messages which are identical to those generated
by a real source. In networks with more than one fake
source node this results in a recipient, i.e., an attacker or
intermediate node, the dropping messages from two different
fake source nodes on the basis that the messages were
identical. If fake source nodes generated unique messages,
duplicates would never be encountered and hence this
message dropping could not occur. The unique messages
extension is intended to ensure that an attacker will be
forced to relocate more frequently. However, it should be
remembered that the energy consumption of intermediate
nodes is likely to increase due to increased network traffic.
Multiple Attackers (MA): The possibility of multiple at-
tackers is explored by having four attackers co-ordinate
their actions whenever a new message is received. The
network grid is divided into quadrants, where each attacker
was assigned a quadrant within which to operate. When an
attacker receives a new message, they move to the sender of
the message and instruct all other attackers to drop messages
which are identical to the received message. The extension
was run in conjunction with the unique messages extension,
as it seeks to ensure that a received message provokes a
response from exactly one attacker.
Increased Rates (IR): To this point it has been assumed
that real sources and fake sources broadcast messages at a
rate of 1 message per second. The increased rates extension
observes protocol performance when the broadcast rates of
fake sources is increased to 2 and 4 messages per second.
VI. RESULTS
In this section we present the results generated by the
described experiments. We first implement a distributed
eavesdropper as a single mobile attacker. We then focus
on another implementation of the multiple attacker variant
of distributed eavesdropper, investigating the impact of this
implementation on the fake source technique.
Table I: Safety period for network sizes under test
Network Size Average Time Taken (secs) Safety Period (secs)
11×11 16.00 32.01
15×15 23.41 46.83
21×21 34.74 69.50
25×25 42.89 85.77
A. Single Attacker on Flooding
The flooding protocol is used as a baseline routing technique,
against which we will compare all privacy-aware routing
protocols. The reason for using flooding as baseline is that (i)
it has a high message delivery ratio, (ii) a subset of messages
gets delivered along the shortest path from source to sink
and (iii) it has been shown to offer poor levels of privacy.
A concept called safety period was introduced in [5] to
capture the number of messages that has to be sent by the
real source before it gets detected. In general, for maximum
privacy, the safety period should ideally be high. In this
paper we use an alternative, but similar, definition for safety
period. For each network size, using flooding, we calculate
the average time it takes to detect the real source / capture
the asset. Then, when running simulations for privacy-aware
protocols, we allow for a higher safety period, since the
premise is that the proposed routing techniques will provide
a higher source location privacy and may require more
messages. The reason for this definition of safety period is
that it bounds simulation time. The safety period, for each
network size, for flooding is shown in Table I. Observe that
the safety period is twice the average time taken for source
detection / asset capture.
B. Single Attacker on FS1
The first phase of FS1 is a flooding phase, during which
the real source floods the network with messages. Upon
receiving the first of these messages, the sink sends a choose
message to h nodes, where h is the distance between the
source and sink. Thus, for a threshold value τ , h+1 nodes
will decide to become a fake source based on Equation 1.
(1− τ)h+1 (1)
For example, with a threshold value of 0.9 and a distance
of 5 from source to sink, the probability of a given node
becoming a fake source node is 0.000001.
We observe from Figure 2b that FS1 offers a similar level
of privacy as baseline routing, i.e., FS1 provides poor privacy
as the capture ratios are comparable, especially when the
threshold is high. This is due to the low number of fake
sources selected, which is due to the very low probability of
a node being selected as a fake source. This low number of
fake sources is reflected in the network energy consumed.
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Figure 1: Flooding (baseline)
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Figure 2: FS1
C. Single Attacker on FS2
The first phase of FS2 is a flooding phase, during which
the real source floods the network with messages. Upon
receiving the first of these messages, the sink sends a choose
message and each intermediate node becomes forwarders of
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Figure 3: FS2
the message. Only potential fake sources generate a random
number to decide whether to become a fake source.
We observe that this technique significantly improves
upon the FS1 technique. To determine the level of privacy
imparted by the FS2 technique, a closer look at the capture
ratio from Figure 3b shows that the technique provides a
significant improvement on privacy by reducing the capture
ratio by as much as 50.5%. On the other hand, the delivery
ratio is comparable to that of baseline routing (flooding)
since the technique does not generate significantly more
messages than in baseline routing, and thus not resulting
in many message collisions. The network (resp. attacker)
energy spent to provide privacy to (resp. capture) the asset
increases, but are roughly commensurate.
D. Single Attacker on FS2 with UM
Combining FS2 and the UM extension involves every fake
source broadcasting messages that are unique.The intention
here is to promote more frequent attacker relocation.
Figure 4c shows how incorporating the unique message
extension increases network energy consumption. This in-
crease, which is attributable to the increased volume of
traffic on the network, can be as high as 75.9% with respect
to baseline routing, whilst the corresponding increased using
only FS2 was 60.4%. Broadcasting unique messages has a
negative impact on an attacker. The larger volume of network
traffic means that an attacker receives more messages and
consumes more power. As messages are unique, an attacker
must also relocate more frequently and will take longer to
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Figure 4: FS2 with UM
find a real source. The consequences of this can be seen in
Figure 4b, which shows that the capture ratio can be reduced
by as a much as 60% compared to flooding. This level of
privacy is also an improvement over FS2, which reduced the
capture ratio by up to 50.5% compared to the same baseline.
E. Single Attacker on FS2 with UM and IR
We now observe the performance of the approach offering
the highest levels of privacy, i.e. FS2 and UM, when message
broadcast rates are increased to 2 and 4 messages per second.
Figure 5c confirms the intuition that network energy
increases with broadcast rate, i.e., broadcasting messages
frequently increases energy consumption. It can be seen
from Figure 5a that increasing the frequency with which
messages are broadcast reduces the delivery ratio, though
Figure 5b shows that the capture ratio remains stable at
around 0.4. This is because nodes have to generate a random
number to decide whether to become a fake source, thus
in some situation no fake sources were generated, i.e., no
potential fake source generated a random number greater
than the threshold, meaning that an attacker can find the real
source within the safety period. This is supported by the fact
that proportion of simulations with zero fake sources was 30-
40%. We conclude is that, whenever there are fake sources
in the network, robust privacy is provided. Observe that the
threshold parameter provides a tradeoff between the number
of fake sources (hence network energy) and capture ratio
(hence source location privacy). A lower threshold results
in a lower capture ratio and higher energy consumption.
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Figure 5: FS2 with UM and IR
F. Multiple Attackers on FS2 with UM
To this point FS2 with UM has been shown to provide the
best location privacy, achieving reductions in the capture
ratio of up to 60% with reduced network energy. We now ob-
serve how this extended protocol performs in the context of
multiple attackers, which is another possible implementation
for distributed eavesdropper [3]. Here, attackers uses only
minimal inference to coordinate, i.e., attackers coordinate
only to ensure that no more than one attacker relocates in
response to any single message.
Figure 6b shows a increase in the capture ratio of ap-
proximately 100% over FS2 and UM. This increase can be
explained by the simple coordination between attackers. If
an attacker has a fake source within its operating quadrant,
it will receive corresponding fake messages and then prevent
the other attackers from reacting to the associated fake
source, even when they receive the same fake messages. One
attacker, A, will have a quadrant that has the real source.
As other attackers will receive fake messages before they
are received by A, A can move towards the real source
whilst dropping messages from fake sources. The energy
consumption associated with each attacker is increased in the
context of multiple, coordinating attackers. When operating
in isolation, an attacker only needs to receive messages.
However, in the presence of multiple attackers, additional
message must be sent and received in order to facilitate
cooperation. The consumed network energy, number of fake
sources and the delivery ratio are broadly similar to those
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Figure 6: Multiple attackers on FS2 with UM
for FS2 with UM, thus implying that these metrics are
invariant to the presence of multiple attackers. An important
point to observe is that, though a single mobile attacker and
multiple attackers are viable implementations of a distributed
eavesdropper, the fact that they have such different impacts
suggests the possible existence of other dimensions to an
attacker model that are not captured by the taxonomy
proposed by Benenson et.al [3].
G. Multiple Attackers on FS2 with UM and PR
Since multiple attackers induce an increase in the capture
ratio when using FS2 with UM, a simple technique to
circumvent the coordination logic of the attackers, which
is based on the premise that only one attacker should follow
any given fake message, must be developed. To achieve this
we adapt the Phantom Routing (PR) protocol proposed in
[5]. Phantom routing is a technique whereby a real source
sends a message on a directed random walk of length τ .
After τ hops, the node that has the message behaves as
the real source of the message and proceeds to flood the
network with messages. The idea here is that, since different
nodes will initiate the flooding, the attacker will not receive
successive messages, thus making it difficult to capture the
source within the safety period. Results for the adapted
Phantom Routing approach are presented in Figure 7, which
shows for FS2 with UM and PR in presence of multiple
attackers, the capture ratio falls to around 50%, which is an
improvement on using only FS2 with UM.
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Figure 7: Multiple attackers on FS2 with UM and PR
VII. CONCLUSION
In this section we summarise the achievements of this paper
and discuss future work relating to source location privacy.
A. Summary
In this paper we explored different implementations, con-
figurations and extensions of the fake source technique for
source location privacy. We have detailed implementations
of the fake source technique which avoid a prohibitively
expensive pre-configuration phase and the requirement that
fake sources to be known a priori. In the development of
the proposed implementations we have made no assumptions
regarding the capabilities of sensor nodes, except that they
are capable of sensing and relaying data. We have shown
that, under the implementations considered, it is possible to
achieve a reduction in capture ratio of up to 60%. We also
explained that the 40% miss rate is due to the fact that no
fake source may be selected on some occasions. We have
further investigated the privacy provided by FS2 with unique
messages in presence of multiple attackers. Our results show
that multiple attackers cause a significant increase in capture
ratio, which can be reduced through phantom routing.
B. Future Work
In future work we plan to undertake a greater exploration
of variants and extensions to the described techniques. In
particular, we intend to investigate how to provide enhanced
levels of security whilst minimising the energy consumption
of sensor nodes in the presence of multiple attackers
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